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Islah Jad:
The Post-Oslo Palestine and Gendering Palestinian 
Citizenship
Birzeit University, Palestine
This article examines the gendering of Palestinian 
citizenship which occurred in the decade immediately 
following the creation of the PA. Based on extensive 
interviews, official documents, and personal experience, it 
traces the evolution of women’s political, social and 
economic actions from the early charitable societies, to a 
popular mass women’s movement with ties to various 
political parties and including many sectors of the 
population, to its fragmentation into two main currents – 
on the one hand, the Islamist women’s movement, and on the
other, a secular, donor-driven proliferation of 
professional institutions, many attempting to develop a 
gender agenda within the severe constraints facing the
PA and their position within it. It is with the latter 
group that this paper deals; Islamist manifestations of the 
women’s movement are dealt with elsewhere.
The article describes both the difficulties and 
opportunities confronting women’s organisations in the 
early years of the Palestinian Authority. It discusses the 
PA’s treatment of women and the dramatic transformation in 
the image of women fostered by the PA, which helped alter 
the role of woman in modern Palestinian history from 
militaristic guerrilla fighter and grass-roots organiser to 
-- at least on the secular front -- “professional” 
“femocrat” heading a new kind of nongovernmental
organisation, or NGO. The article emphasises the externally
imposed restrictions which defend the Palestinian Authority 
from charges of “neopatrimonialism”, while at the same time 
offering a critique of the limitations of NGOs and 
institutions of “civil society” existing in such a 
situation. It ends with a case study of the General Union 
of Palestinian Women (GUPW), one of the most important 
Palestinian women’s organisations and a leader in the 
Palestinian national movement.
Engaging gendered citizenship in the Middle East
In the Middle East, the emergence of the notion of 
citizenship has been related to the quest for equality for 
women in the public sphere and has included an attempt to 
theorize women’s status in relation to both the state and 
community (Joseph 1986: 3-8, 2000; Molyneux 1985; Kandiyoti 
1991, 2001). This in turn has been associated with 
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contestations over the relationship between the state and
civil society (Bishara 1996; Norton 1993, 1995). The 
gendered nature of social transformation, revived “an 
ahistorical notion of Middle Eastern exceptionalism”
(Sadowski 1993; Zubaida 1988, 1995, 2000). Neo-Orientalists 
cast the Middle East as blighted by a failure to modernise 
due to its essentialised nature (Pipes 1983: 187-8 in 
Sadowski 1993: 18; Bill and Springborg 1990; Lewis 1964, 
1988; Kedourie 1992; Crone, 1980).
Feminist evaluations of citizenship in the Middle East 
suggest that the question of women’s rights exposes 
significant “fault lines in modern concepts of citizenship”
(Kandiyoti 2000: xv). The feminist critique focuses on the 
continuing role of kinbased, communal entities and their 
incorporation into different systems of governance, either 
as recognised parts of the political system, or as the 
source of various forms of nepotism and clientelism (ibid: 
xv). Some feminists have argued that citizenship concepts 
do not apply and call for a more culture-specific approach 
to address the complex way in which these systems serve to
simultaneously empower and disempower women (Joseph 1994, 
2000; Al-Torki 2000; Charrad 2000). Others have argued in 
favour of citizenship concepts and call for the expansion 
of women’s rights as individuals, as they “condemn the
stranglehold that communal and religious forces exercise 
over them” (Kandiyoti 2000: xv; Hatem 2000; Hale 2000; Jad 
et al., 2000; Amawi 2000).
In the Arab world, women’s rights were tackled by post-
colonial national elites in their initiatives for 
modernisation and development by the introduction of 
policies to increase women’s employment and education, 
control of women’s fertility, and provision of social 
services were central to modernisation and led to changes 
in gender relations (Kandiyoti 1991). While introducing 
these top-down reforms and creating the ‘new, modern 
woman,’ these states tended to restrict and ban all forms 
of autonomous organisations (Kandiyoti 1991a). In short, 
they expanded the notion of social rights but 
simultaneously restricted political and civic rights which 
contradicted the evolutionary path of citizenship charted 
by Marshall in which civil and political rights are secured 
before the introduction of social rights. 
However, women’s introduction into the labour market did 
not produce a substantive change in the sexual division of 
labour. Women were perceived by these national elites both 
as modern citizens and as bearers of cultural authenticity 
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(Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989). This contradiction figured 
in most of their national constitutions in which women were 
defined as equal citizens, but with fewer rights than men 
because the realm of the family remained governed by 
shari’a, a strict interpretation of Islamic law which, 
among other things, primarily defines women as dependants. 
Women’s rights and shari’a law became part of a dominant 
debate on the Middle East, including Palestine.
Gender and the PA: The Legal Contours of Palestinian 
Citizenship
The Palestinian Authority from its inception was able to 
function at best as a kind of “quasi-state”, divided and 
constrained by rigid and ever-evolving conditions and 
sanctions which deprived it of the power to govern in any 
meaningful way, its very existence in question. The 
experience left deep scars on the Palestinian community at 
large and on gender relations in particular.
In the Palestinian case, there is a tendency by critics to 
ignore external factors which affect the normal functioning 
of the PA and which affect the contractual relations 
between state and citizen These included the restrictions 
on local resources under siege by the Israelis (Khan and 
Hilal 2004); the highly volatile political situation 
obfuscating developmental planning; the Islamic movement,
Hamas’ internal political opposition to the PA, and the 
nature of PA policies themselves, influenced as they were 
by earlier forms of Palestinian nationalism and by 
convoluted and ever-tightening Israeli-imposed constraints. 
As Molyneux has stated, government policies and a 
commitment to women’s emancipation have a crucial impact on 
the content of women’s citizenship (2001: 50). Likewise, 
any of the factors just described can hinder the process of 
women’s emancipation and their claim for rights.
The legal contours of Palestinian citizenship were drawn by 
gender as well as by history, which were tied to the land 
and to the father (Massad 1995: 468-9) With the 
establishment of the Palestinian Authority, Palestinian 
citizenship became a dilemma. The Oslo Agreement only 
granted the PA the right to issue a Basic Law. The first 
drafts of the Basic Law reflected the fact the Authority 
could not define Palestinian identity according to the 
tenets of Palestinian nationalism.
Rather than formalizing a separation between Palestinian 
nationality/identity and Palestinian citizenship, the first 
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drafts of the Law postponed the definition of citizenship 
to some future period of legislation (Hammami and Johnson 
1999).
Article 12 of a later (March, 2003) version of the 
Palestinian Basic Law specified the ways in which 
Palestinian nationality was to be transmitted. The basis of
transmitting citizenship -- before 1984, blood ties through 
the father -- was changed to include blood ties to both 
parents, under the pressure of the women’s movement. For 
the first time in an Arab state, women were given the right 
to grant their citizenship to their children (Jad 2003: 9). 
Earlier drafts of the Basic Law had stated that Palestine 
recognised and respected a whole set of universal 
agreements and declarations, including the United Nations 
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which provided a 
basis for the adoption of universal conventions as sources 
for legislation. In the first four drafts, which were 
subject to popular discussion, shari’a was not mentioned as 
a source of legislation; nor was Islam adopted as the state 
religion. However, under the pressure of Islamists, both 
were later added by the Legislative Council, (which, 
parenthetically, was mostly constituted of secular members. 
It is worth noting here that the Palestinian Legislative 
Council did not include Islamist members, since the 
Islamist political groups had boycotted the elections, 
which they saw as an outcome of Oslo, a process they 
opposed.)
There are some revealing passages that deal with work and 
motherhood which denote a ‘lip service’ approach to 
changing gender relations. Article 23, for example, in the 
Law declares: “Woman has the right to participate actively 
in social, political, cultural and economic life, and the 
Law will work to eliminate constraints that forbid women 
from fully participating in the construction of their
families and society” (Jad et al. 2003:10) However, in many 
laws, such as the Civil Law and Civil Service Law, women 
were depicted as dependent on men. More importantly, 
changes in the laws were not translated into policies in
instances that necessitated a financial commitment on the 
part of the PA.
Paralleling the unclear definition of citizenship was the 
PA’s lack of a coherent set of policies intended to enforce 
the rule of law as an important guarantor for citizens’ 
rights, in particular with respect to security 
responsibilities. Physical attacks on members of the 
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Legislative Council, raids on Palestinian universities,
closures of private media stations, and arrests of 
journalists and student leaders all demonstrated non-
adherence to the rule of law and a lack of respect for 
civil rights. (Palestine Report, April 2000). These 
repressive measures placed women activists in a dilemma. To 
increase their power, women had to form alliances with 
other social groups. But such alliances were problematic. 
On the one hand, forming alliances would mean that the 
women’s movement would have to adopt a critical political 
position vis-à-vis PA practices, a stand which might lead 
to similar repercussions on women’s activism. On the other 
hand, failure to adopt a position would discredit their 
demands and lose them legitimacy in civil society. The 
grass-roots women’s organisations linked to Fateh, the 
ruling party, were, in fact, discredited for just this 
reason.
In the case of the PA, there was an inability to provide 
even the most basic right -- to work, to health and other 
services -- because these were being privatised with the 
adoption of structural adjustment policies. The shift to 
neo-liberal policies serves to erode the legitimacy of the 
state as its capacity to deliver social services was 
impaired (Kandiyoti 1991). The PA’s deficiencies in 
providing basic rights contrasted with the gender-friendly 
language frequently employed by Palestinian officials, 
supposedly demonstrating their commitment to women’s 
emancipation and gender equality but which in effect 
reflected UN pressures to conform with requirements to take 
gender into account.
The Palestinian “Quasi”- State: Neo-Patrimonialism or 
Gender Mainstreaming?
The power of the state -- to enhance women’s choices 
creates opportunities for collaborative relationships with 
women’s groups. However, the same state can also use its 
resources and coercive apparatus to reinforce existing 
genderretrogressive biases within the family and community, 
introducing points of conflict (Rai 1996; Agarwal 1994; 
Goetz 1997; Kandiyoti 1991).
The Palestinian Authority has been extensively theorised as 
neo-patrimonial, with writers pointing to its personal 
patronage and corruption with inherently patriarchal 
tendencies which systematically disadvantage women. In 
accordance with the charges of neo-patrimonialism in 
reference to the Palestinian Authority (Hillel 1998, Parker 
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199, Hilal 1999), some feminists consider the state to be a
male-dominated apparatus against which women have to fight 
(Wilson 1977; Eisenstein 1989; Pateman 1988; Mackinnon 
1989). In countries with a strong tradition of welfare 
state politics, there has been less resistance to dealing 
with the state, with both interest articulation and 
participation in state functioning seen in a positive 
light. The notion of the state as constituting one 
homogenous arena against which social forces, such as 
feminists and Islamists, struggle has been
replaced with a conceptualisation of the state as 
heterogeneous institutional arenas with different power 
relations and offering different possibilities of
contestation. Kandiyoti drew attention to an important 
marker of most postcolonial Arab states in enforcing kin-
based and communal entities in their quest for legitimacy 
(Kandiyoti 2000: xv). The PA was not different, in the 
sense that in its quest for legitimacy it looked for the 
consent of contradictory social groupings, upper middle 
class, refugees, kin-based tribes and feminists. Women in 
the PA apparatus were seen as a source of legitimacy, with 
their gender units, requested and supported by foreign 
funding, serving as a secular, liberal image for the new
authority.
In the following section I focus on the character and 
conduct of the PA as the main recruiter for women in the 
public sector.
From ‘Self-help’ to ‘Self-government’: Femocrats, between 
Patronage and Feminism
One group of players coming into its own with the formation 
of the Palestinian Authority was that of the “femocrats”, a 
term originally referred to women who are employed within a 
state bureaucracy to work on advancing the position of 
women in the wider society through advancement of policies 
supportive of equal opportunity and anti-discrimination 
(Yeatman 1990). Palestinian femocrats are not necessarily 
feminist, nor are they “employed within state bureaucratic
positions to work on advancing the position of women in the 
wider society through the development of equal opportunity 
and anti-discrimination” (Yeatman 1990: 65). Most 
Palestinian femocrats, in particular those in high-ranking
positions, are nominated through patronage relations and 
not for their feminist credentials. However, these women 
are neither co-opted women who are waiting for the 
President to give them the mot d’ordre just to act on his 
behalf, nor are they innovators; rather, they are somewhere 
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in between. In other words, some of them may try to develop 
a gender agenda within the numerous constraints facing
the PA and their positioning within it, while others may 
use the gender agenda and their political access to promote 
their own interests. Thus, patronage per se is not 
necessarily anti-feminist or against women’s 
representation. In this sense, it is safe to denote these 
women as femocrats, since they deploy women’s interests and 
rights, whether they ‘truly’ believe in them or not, to 
make a space for themselves within the PA and society.
The Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Advancement of 
Women’s Status (lajnet al tansiq al wizaria leraf’a makanat 
al mara’a) (hereafter referred to as IMCAW) was the locus 
of femocrats within the Palestinian ‘state’ apparatus until 
the committee’s dissolution and the establishment of the 
Ministry of Women’s Affairs.
IMCAW consisted of women in key positions in their 
respective ministries, mostly nominated by the President to 
mainstream gender in their structures. In 1994, Palestinian 
women’s movements within the Occupied Territories developed 
a project to establish a ministry for women’s affairs 
within the PA. The President did not approve this, and 
IMCAW was created instead. The proposal triggered a 
conflict between, on the one hand, the Minister of Social 
Affairs and the head of the General Union of Palestinian 
Women, or GUPW (both expatriate Palestinians who had been 
working in the Diaspora), and on the other, the head of the
Women’s Affairs Technical Committees, or WATC (a local 
woman who had been working in the Occupied Territories). 
Expecting just such a conflict between those who had been 
working outside the Occupied Territories and those who had 
been working on the ground, under Israeli military 
occupation, Arafat suggested in his
meeting with the women’s delegation that the new body 
should include women both in the government and in the GUPW 
(Arafat, Interview), thus combining a committee (IMCAW) 
created by the PA with an organisation (GUPW) established
in the time of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
(PLO), before the existence of the Palestinian Authority.
Success in fundraising and capacity-building was seen as 
vital for women in IMCAW to prove themselves professionals; 
they attempted, it seems, to imitate professional women in 
NGOs at the expense of their ‘old’ image as militants.
Thus NGOisation set the model for the ‘old’ militants and 
was their path to professionalisation. In the Palestinian 
Development Plan (1996-1998), The
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committee was heavily dependent on donor aid and was 
working as an NGO (or in this case, a GONGO, a governmental 
non-governmental organization) and women were lumped into 
gender units, in which many women activists were coopted,
while women’s gender equity was not integrated into the 
economic and political agendas of the new ‘secular’ PA. The 
lack of an overall goal for development led femocrats in 
IMCAW to focus on technicalities, such as how many 
workshops were needed for a mainstreaming plan. The 
confusions and conflicts within IMCAW reflected a similar 
trend in all ministries and structures of the PA. These 
seriously hindered not only attempts at mainstreaming 
gender but also any serious attempts at sustaining 
development. One could hardly speak of an orchestrated 
clear national project for change. Incoherent, 
contradictory and sometimes conflicting policies and 
interventions were the rule.
The Ministry of Women’s Affairs, the locus of Palestinian 
femocrates passed through a tough test when the Islamist 
came to power after the legislative elections of January 
2006. There was an international debate within the 
Islamists whether they should hold the responsibility of 
this Ministry or leave it for other non-Islamic forces. The 
debate ended up by holding the Ministry to ‘prove that the 
Islamists can advance better women’s needs and interests 
(Amal Syyam, Women’s Affairs Minister November 10, 2009). 
The two Hamas women ministers Mariam Saleh and Amal Syyam, 
got the green light from the Cabinet to ‘advance’ 
Palestinian women’s status through the establishment of 
women’s multi purposes centres in the West Bank and Gaza. 
The centres suppose to provide different skills and 
orientation for women, particularly those political 
prisoners or martyrs.
Conflict soon irrupted in the Women’s Ministry between 
women from Fateh party and the Islamists for political 
rivalry concealed in ‘feminsit visage’. The Fateh women 
perceived the Islamists as lacking a ‘feminist vision’, 
while the Isalmists complained from the lack of 
professionalism characterised by the refusal of Fateh women 
to handle the authority to the Islamists by hiding files 
and documents and the refusal to cooperate at all levels. 
The internal conflict escalated to some physical attacks by 
Fateh women that led the Islamists to seek the protection 
of body guards. The conflict proved that a common gender 
agenda was not possible between women belonging to 
different rival political parties.
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If gender mainstreaming suffered from conflict and 
confusion within the PA, women’s activism in civil society 
was in no better shape. The establishment of the PA led to 
de-mobilisation of grass-roots organisations and of the 
GUPW, one of the most important Palestinian women’s 
organisations, which was connected both with the PA, and 
therefore with its ruling party, Fateh, and with the PLO, 
as will be explained below.
GUPW: Between Mobilisation and NGOisation
The structure of the General Union of Palestinian Women 
(GUPW), whether in the Diaspora, where it was able to 
function beyond the repressive reach of the Israeli 
government, or in its various incarnations in the homeland, 
was an outcome of the continual change which has always 
characterised Palestinian politics. Unrelenting instability 
led to the freezing of most of the elections in all bodies 
belonging to the PLO, including the Union. The last 
election for the GUPW was organised in Tunisia in 1985, 
following the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon in 1982.
In an attempt to solve the problems posed by geographical 
dispersion, a new representative body was formed to be the 
reference point for the Executive Committee (al amana’a al 
a’ama) of the GUPW in the absence of general conferences. 
The structure of the GUPW in the Occupied Territories had 
always been different from its structure in the Diaspora 
due to circumstances imposed by the Israeli Occupation. The 
GUPW was banned in the Occupied Territories by the Israeli 
authority on the grounds that it was part of a ‘terrorist’ 
organisation.
This resulted in the leadership’s functioning in the 
Occupied Territories through a body of legal charitable 
organisations which existed in the main cities in the West
Bank. Gaza did not at first join the GUPW for fear that the 
leader of the Arab Women’s Union, Yussra al Barbari, would 
be deported. Thus divided and truncated, the General Union 
of Palestinian Women was unable to function as a national 
organisation. Soon, even most of the charitable 
organisations involved in ‘national’ activities were 
harassed and shut down; and the head of the largest one, 
Samiha Khalil (aka. Im Khalil) was put under town arrest. 
These acts paralysed the power of the GUPW to play a 
leading role in women’s resistance to the Occupation. 
Meanwhile, an older generation of women active in 
charitable societies were in control of the Union, a 
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situation which presaged conflict with the new generation 
of women activists in the newly formed grass-roots 
organisations.
Grass-roots women’s committees emerged to fill the vacuum 
left by the General Union of Palestinian Women and then, 
due to political factionalism, began mushrooming. The 
committees brought new blood to the leadership of the 
Palestinian women’s movement but were not allowed by the 
old leadership to join the underground structure of the 
Union. Supported by their parent political parties, these 
new committees started to gain a new and broad constituency 
due to their innovative approaches in organising women. 
However, the non-existence of the Union in the Gaza Strip 
facilitated the creation of a new branch of the
GUPW, headed by a powerful figure, Najla Yassine (aka. Im 
Nasser), a member of the EC and treasurer of the GUPW in 
the Diaspora. She had easy access to the President’s Office 
and consequently to some resources. The GUPW targeted all 
women activists in Gaza whether in women’s committees or 
NGOs, or newly appointed to the public sector. While one of 
the main issues raised in the West Bank was the 
independence of the Union from the PA, this was not the 
issue in Gaza, due to the ways in which new members were 
recruited. It seems that patronage links, as in other 
bodies connected to the PA, were commonly used in instances 
varying from distribution of food coupons and exemption 
from membership fees to provision of aid and social 
services. The links were also used for the distribution of 
membership forms to women working in government bodies 
urging them to join the Union (Mona, Interview). The 
structure of the GUPW in Gaza was mainly built on the 
persona of its founder. After she became ill, almost all 
activities were frozen and the Union proved incapable of 
competing with the growing power of the Islamists in Gaza.
The establishment of a new structure for the GUPW in the 
West Bank was less successful for a number of reasons. For 
one, the structure of the GUPW in the West Bank had already 
been weakened; for another, the Union, as in the thirties,
was based on members representing their charitable 
societies rather than on individual members. The average 
(older) age of the charitable society representatives, 
their middle-class background, and their ‘do-gooding’ 
approach to women did not help enlarge the Union’s 
constituency. As for the representatives of the women’s 
committees, it is clear that they were too busy
with their own committees to invest any real efforts in 
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establishing a structure in which they might not gain more 
power.
The freeze in the expansion of the GUPW was not only 
related to the power struggle between the ‘returnees’, who 
had been living abroad, and the ‘locals’, who had been 
living in the Occupied Territories. It was also related to 
facts on the ground created by Oslo. When Salwa Abu Khadra, 
head of both the GUPW and the EC, was faced with persistent 
criticisms about the lack of new elections
she stated that:
We cannot organise it [the election] in the Diaspora as an 
issue of principle; the Occupied Territories are now the 
centre of the headquarters of the leadership. Also it will 
be very costly to bring big numbers of women 
representatives from the Diaspora: the Union coffers are 
empty. And even if they restrict the election to members 
living in the homeland in Gaza and the West Bank, the 
members in Gaza cannot join because of the siege (Salwa, 
Interview).
Another factor in the contraction of the GUPW, and one also 
related to tensions between women of the Diaspora and 
grass-roots women who had been living in the homeland, had 
to do with the Union’s relationship with the PA. Upon their
return, the Diasporic leadership announced that the Union 
was a nongovernmental body, but daily practice belied this 
claim. The leadership and its administrative staff received 
monthly salaries, and the rent of their luxurious villas
was paid for by the PA. This reality was used by the local 
leadership to challenge the GUPW’s claim of being a NGO.
Clearly, GUPW’s financial dependence on the PA was seen as 
a sign that the organisation had become a mere hack for the 
PA. This was stated by another interviewee from the local 
group:
Every time we want to publish a leaflet or any political 
document, they [the GUPW?] always insist that we have to 
add some glorifying sentences about the President, and they 
ask us to display his photos. We are rebellious here; we 
are not used to that. Also, they objected to one of our
leaders attending a conference in Amman because she was one 
of the signatories of a leaflet published by an opposition 
group criticising corruption in the PA. Of course we have 
to criticize the government; this is our right. We are not 
representing the government. We represent our people, our 
women (B, Interview).
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Working in favour of the returnees was the fact that the 
new head of the Administrative Committee was less powerful 
than the previous head, because of her lesser-known history 
of militancy and because she was “less political” and
Christian, factors which strengthened the control of the 
returnees over the Union.
Saying this does not mean that women in the local 
leadership had no power base of their own. They developed 
ties with women’s NGOs and with grass-roots women’s 
organisations belonging to political parties; and they 
invested all their efforts in building a popular base for 
the Union, especially in rural areas. The second intifada 
led to the inclusion of the ‘local’ head of the GUPW in the
National and Islamic Leadership of the intifada, considered 
the highest popular political structure formed by the 
political activists belonging to political parties, unions 
and grass-roots organisations.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have provided an overview of how the PA 
constructed the legal contours of citizenship and gender 
relations through legislation, policies and cultural 
constructions of Palestinian nationalism. Based on the 
historical trajectory of the Palestinian national movement, 
I have argued that the Palestinian Authority had neither 
gender vision nor a political project for social
change but that, despite being donor-dependent, weak and 
fragmented, the Authority still showed some positive 
reactions to women’s well-organised efforts at pressure. 
Finally, I have questioned scholars’ depictions of the 
Palestinian Authority as neo-patrimonial. The label is 
untenable, given the origins of the PA.
Nor does it allow for the externally-imposed lack of 
political stability and lack of control over national 
resources which have stood in the way of gender 
mainstreaming. Moreover, it takes no account of the 
conflicts created within and between bureaucracies by the 
merging of the old PLO with the new PA and the emergence of 
the new NGOs.
The cases of the Palestinian Authority gender units and of 
the GUPW suggest that international blueprints for women 
and development might not be best suited to the Palestinian 
situation, in which a continuing brutal military Occupation
greatly hinders the application of most of the mechanisms 
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for development. All these blueprints assume a situation of 
political normality and stability, the existence of a state 
with functioning structures, and a stable and well-defined 
civil society. The tendency of outside ‘experts’ is to 
ignore the impact of structural and national instability 
and to pursue the implementation of previously designed
‘projects’ of mainstreaming gender. In this paper, I have 
argued that the Palestinian women’s movement, in the 
process of claiming citizenship rights, assumed the 
‘normality’ of the newly established PA and a period of 
political stability which they hoped would lead to a 
fulfilment of their national, political and social rights. 
The examples I have given show that Palestinian women’s 
activism has not been undertaken by a movement representing 
all women’s interests, but rather can be seen as a site of 
conflicting interests, power relations, and variable
positioning. What then could femocrats and their gender 
units do, in a situation with no political stability, no 
unified women’s front in civil society and a questionable 
commitment of the quasi-state?
The experience of women in the EC, as well as some women 
femocrats from the Diasporic leadership, demonstrates that 
elites whose power came from their leading role in the 
national resistance in the Diaspora did not necessarily 
lose power when the political system and their physical 
location changed nor were they passive followers of 
political leadership. In order to secure their self-
interest while appearing to comply with the leadership and 
with the prevailing patronage norm, they used the same norm 
to hold their leaders accountable. Compliance with the 
political leadership in the Occupied Territories was the 
main strategy for Diasporic women leaders to achieve gains; 
they did not, as Razavi shows, seek autonomy or 
independence (as many feminists assume) as a pre-condition 
for women to realise their interests (Peteet 1991; Molyneux 
2001. Nor were women in the PA and in the GUPW mere passive 
recipients of foreign aid. On the contrary, they worked to 
direct this aid to increase their gains and to strengthen
their negotiating power vis-à-vis the PA and other women’s 
groups in civil society. More significant in terms of 
women’s empowerment, this paper has shown the impact of 
women’s activism on PA policies and how it has expanded
the boundaries of their rights as equal citizens. At the 
same time, it has been painfully apparent that the 
situation has caused women to limit the goals they set
for themselves and therefore to have, in the end, less 
success in achieving women’s rights than they might 
otherwise have had.
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In the end, the state is responsible for regulating macro-
level forces in a more gender-equitable manner (Razavi and 
Miller 1995: 4). Goetz has shown that the success of “the 
gender equity interest in policy making and policy 
implementation will depend upon the interaction of three 
major factors: the strength of the gender equity lobby in 
civil society, the credibility of feminist politicians and 
policies in political competitions, and the capacity of the 
state to enforce commitments to gender equity” (Goetz 2003: 
30). In this analysis, I submit that while women’s NGOs and 
grass-roots organisations have an important role to play in 
creating space for women to politicise their demands, there 
are serious limits to what institutions of civil society 
can achieve.
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